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The value of ignorance for teacher training on autism: a reading of Jacques Rancière 
In May 2016 it was announced by the Department of Education in England that training on 
autism is to become a core part of teacher education (Espinoza, 2016). Charities, parents 
and autistic advocates welcomed such a move, having long argued that the learning 
experience for children on the autism spectrum has been marked by a lack of understanding 
among practitioners regarding their different learning needs. This policy undoubtedly 
represents a progressive step forward for a group of learners who have historically 
experienced high levels of inequality within the school system; however, I argue that (1) 
where such a programme of training aligns with the dominant ‘what works’ agenda based 
on the privileged knowledge of ‘experts’, there is also a danger of silencing other voices, in 
particular those of autistic learners and trainee teachers themselves; and (2) that ignorance 
may in fact provide a more ethical approach to such an endeavour. This paper draws on 
Jacques Rancière’s 1987 book The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons on Intellectual 
Emancipation (English translation 1991)1, in which he argues that the stultifying 
educational process of explication perpetuates inequality by dividing the world into those 
authorised to speak and those not. Such a claim will be analysed and applied to the training 
on autism for teachers with a view to uncovering potential sites of inequality in this process. 
Rancière presents his somewhat counter-intuitive position in the form of a narrative based 
on the nineteenth century writings of Joseph Jacotot, a teacher, soldier in the Republican 
army and administrator who was exiled from France following the Restoration of Monarchy 
in 1815 but was granted asylum in the Netherlands as a lecturer in French literature at the 
University of Louvain. Jacotot’s recognition of the power of ignorance is discovered by 
chance and necessity when neither he nor his students had a common language in which to 
communicate; handing them a bilingual version of Fénelon’s masterpiece Télémaque he 
instructed them to learn French through the Flemish translation – to his great surprise the 
students managed without any form of explanation and so was born Jacotot’s radical 
‘universal system’ of learning. Rancière traces Jacotot’s ‘intellectual adventure’ based upon 
this chance experiment from which he draws a range of claims; his most central is that 
anyone can learn by themselves without the need of explication from experts and 
schoolmasters based on ‘the principle of the equality of all speaking beings’ (IS, 39). He 
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argues that rather than creating equality by raising levels of knowledge and understanding, 
an expert’s elucidation in fact perpetuates a pedagogical myth based on a dichotomy of 
intelligence where individuals are divided into ‘knowing minds and ignorant ones, ripe 
minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the stupid’ 
(Ross, 1991:xx). Rancière critiques the pedagogical orthopraxis represented by the ‘Old 
Master’; he indicates the position of power imbued in the act of explication, where ‘having 
thrown a veil of ignorance over everything that is to be learned, he appoints himself to the 
task of lifting it’ (IS, 6). The result for Jacotot, and so Rancière, is a system of enforced 
stultification based on one intelligence subordinating another.   
As the subtitle of Rancière’s book suggests, intellectual emancipation is the ultimate goal of 
his pedagogical endeavours. Emancipation is considered the consciousness of the equality 
of intelligence – it is something ‘seized, even against the scholars, when one teaches oneself’ 
(IS, 99) and according to Biesta (2010, p.42) is based on the Kantian conception of 
enlightenment as release from ‘self-incurred tutelage’ where one is unable to make use of 
‘understanding without the direction from another’. The emancipated schoolmaster or 
expert recognises that ‘I have nothing to teach you’ and so relinquishes his claim to 
superiority; at the same time the learner is liberated to use her own ‘will served by an 
intelligence’ (IS, 52). Here intelligence is attention and research rather than a body of ideas 
and the will, ‘the power to be moved, to act by its own movement’ (IS, 54).  Crucially, 
Rancière argues that the schoolmaster is not to be an expert in the subject but ought rather 
to direct the will of the student to see everything for herself using identified materials, and 
so just as with the Télémaque, the book forms the ‘egalitarian intellectual link between 
master and student’. The ignorant teacher need not verify what the student has found but 
acknowledge that she has searched and paid attention, responding at all times to a three-
part question: ‘what do you see? what do you think about it? what do you make of it? And so 
on, to infinity’ (IS, 23).   
However, Rancière’s notion of emancipation also goes beyond the individual, striking at the 
core of equality in society. He avers that even well-intentioned progressive educationalists 
who wish to narrow the gap between the classes or serve those most marginalised reaffirm 
social inequality where they seek to do so through explication. He argues that by lifting the 
veil ‘step by step, progressively’ using methods tested and compared by way of commissions 
and reports they seek to prevent the people-child falling prey to ‘childish fictions, to routine 
  
and prejudices’; however, what they in fact propose is ‘perfect stultification by perfecting 
explications’ (IS, 121). As Citton (2010, p. 29) suggests Rancière’s reworking of Jacotot leads 
us to question the political uses of expertise where the  
expert represents a potential threat to democratic politics in so far as his very enunciation 
divides the citizenry in two: those who have the knowledge (and who are entitled to 
command), and those who lack the knowledge (and must therefore obey).  
Significantly, Rancière does not condemn having teachers or knowledge per se but he is 
highly critical of those who allow their expert knowledge to become a tool for silencing the 
claims and resistance expressed by ‘the ignorant ones’.  I suggest that Rancière’s subversive 
text The Ignorant Schoolmaster has import in considering the recent announcement of 
training on autism for teachers, particularly with respect to the equality of intelligences in 
this discourse.  
Clearly, the ‘Old Master’ characterised as means-ends rationality, teleology and convergence 
of knowledge creation - all revealed by expert explication - is still prevalent in education 
(Oancea and Pring, 2008). Specific to special and inclusive education, Mitchell (2014, p.3) 
also argues for a ‘what really works’ approach where evidence-based teaching strategies 
can be defined as ‘specified teaching methods that have been shown in controlled research 
to be effective in bringing about desired outcomes in a delineated population of learners’. 
By overemphasising effectiveness, factual judgement, and instrumental knowledge the 
central considerations of educational value and ethics are diminished (Biesta, 2007) leaving 
no epistemic space for voices from the margins. Rancière’s system of enforced stultification, 
where one intelligence subordinates another, resonates strongly with the current discourse 
concerning special education where there is little ‘equality of speaking beings’ and it is 
particularly rare to hear the experiences of learners on the autism spectrum (Milton, 2013).  
By contrast, the knowing mind of the ‘Old Master’ has been elevated to a position of 
authority thus perpetuating self-affirming epistemic communities where people with 
impairments experience, in Fricker’s (2003:164) terms, epistemic injustice through 
‘prejudicial dysfunction in testimonial practice’. Fricker (2007) outlines two types of 
epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. The former is the 
wrong that is done when a deflated level of credibility is given to a speaker’s word for no 
other reason than prejudice based on identity (such as gender, race or impairment); 
whereas the latter relates to the unequal participation in meaning-generating practices in 
  
the social world such that individuals are subordinated in or excluded from those practices. 
It seems clear that autistic people as knowers frequently encounter both forms of epistemic 
injustice insofar as their credibility is deflated on account of their perceived social and 
cognitive deficits and they are often excluded from the development of inclusive practices 
that affect them most. The epistemic injustices experienced by autistic knowers are all the 
more marked when contrasted with experts who, as Ho (2011) asserts, hold significant 
power to assess and pathologise, influence intervention recommendations and resource 
eligibilities and retain the prerogative to reject autistic claims as lacking credibility 
according to their own adopted scientific frameworks. Moreover, I argue that through the 
explicative order of a ‘what really works’ agenda in education, trainee teachers are also 
silenced as knowers in their own right. Whilst not at the level of individuals on the autism 
spectrum, this group are cast as ‘ignorant ones’ and in need of training from experts.   
Is it possible then to adopt the ‘universal system’ of learning outlined by Rancière – where, 
though ignorant, one simply ‘teaches oneself’ – when it comes to improving the educational 
experience of learners on the autism spectrum? I suggest that just as Jacotot’s students 
made use of Fénelon’s Télémaque in order to learn French, thus learning without a ‘master 
explicator’, trainee teachers if they were to be given access to the first-hand accounts of 
autistic learners’ educational experiences and asked ‘what do you see? what do you think 
about it? what do you make of it? And so on, to infinity’ could learn as much as any expert 
could ever explain to them. Rather than being told ‘what works’ for a delineated population 
based on evidence drawn from randomised controlled trials, trainee teachers could learn 
for themselves how best to provide for the diverse range of needs, behaviours and interests 
of pupils on the autism spectrum. Whilst there is not space here to fully explore the capacity 
of this approach in practice, there is some initial evidence to show that when applied among 
higher education practitioners at one university (Vincent, 2015) and used as part of autism 
training across a further three teacher education programmes, those involved were able to 
reflect at a high level on the individual experiences of autistic learners and could identify for 
themselves the most fitting inclusive practice. Such a way of learning reflects a neo-
Aristotelian conception of professionalism whereby teachers engage in phronesis: the 
practical reasoning and deliberation in the exigencies of the moment, all the time revealing 
‘an intelligence to itself" (IS, 28).  
  
Finally, whilst Rancière promotes universal learning as being founded on ignorance, this 
ought not to be misunderstood as one simply being uninformed or existing in a state of self-
deception. In fact his vision of ignorance has much resonance with how Smith (2016, p.276) 
conceptualises the virtue of ‘unknowing’; he suggests that the ‘epistemically admirable 
person’ may sometimes be ‘one who does not know: whose virtues are those of not 
knowing’ by which he appeals to the mysterious (even mystical) kinds of learning where the 
goal has not been preordained in advance and it would in fact be stultifying – to use 
Rancière’s term – for the experts to steer or direct it. To approach the training on autism in 
this way, where experts cede their privilege to being the only authorised voices in the 
discourse, reflects what Ho (2011, p.117) terms ‘epistemic humility’, characterised as one’s 
‘acknowledgment of the boundary of their expert domain as well as their fallibility… [and] a 
recognition that knowledge creation is an interdependent and collaborative activity’. Thus, 
by establishing egalitarian intellectual links between knowers through the use of first-hand 
autistic accounts of learning, the established epistemic order is disrupted allowing for a 
more anarchistic vision of education (Biesta, 2010; Suissa, 2010). Such new arrangements 
have the potential to make learners socio-political agents of change and learning a form of 
direct action leading to independence and autonomy and thus ultimately freedom.     
So as the new academic year gets underway, and government ministers, educators, parents 
and trainee teachers consider how the recent commitment to making training on autism a 
core part of teacher education might be realised in practice, I argue that Rancière’s Ignorant 
Schoolmaster offers important insights in relation to both inclusive practice and the 
credibility of learners on the autism spectrum as valued speaking beings. 
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